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Abstract: 
 
Although there is extensive theoretical and empirical literature discussing the impact of 
revenue sharing agreements on competitive balance in professional sports leagues, there 
has been little work done to improve the structure of current agreements which are 
designed to improve competitive balance.  This paper focuses on the National Basketball 
Association (NBA) and the current revenue sharing agreements it has in place.  This 
paper both evaluates franchises’ efforts in earning revenue sharing payments and offers 
alternative metrics designed to accomplish the goals of league-wide profitability and 
competitive balance.
 
 
1
Outline 
 
Section I – Introduction 
 
Section II – Literature Review and Discussion 
 a) Competitive Balance 
 b) Relevant Model Literature 
 
Section III – Model Description and Nature of Analysis 
 a) Ticket Price Model 
 b) Payroll Model 
 c) Owner Performance Valuation 
 
Section IV – Discussion of Data 
 1) Data Classes 
  a) Demographic Data 
  b) Team Data 
  c) Team Game Statistics 
  d) Population/City Characteristics 
  e) Stadium Characteristics 
  f) Dummies 
  g) Owner Performance Data 
 2) Data Considerations 
 
Section V – Results 
 1) Ticket Price Model 
 2) Payroll Model 
 3) Owner Performance Valuations 
 4) Efficient Evaluation Scorecard 
 
Section VI - Conclusion 
 
 
2
Section I – Introduction 
 
 
 In the sports industry in the United States, the four major leagues (NFL, 
MLB, NBA, NHL) participate in an agreement called revenue sharing.  This agreement 
appears in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and is signed by both the Player’s 
Association and Franchise Ownership.  Revenue sharing is a tool used to redistribute 
revenue between different franchises in a sports league and exists in two basic forms: one 
form is an equal distribution of non-local media, sponsorship and merchandise revenues 
across the teams in a league.  The second is redistributions from large market teams to 
small and medium market teams. 
The reason for participating in revenue sharing is two-fold.  Since teams in large 
markets (high population) have a competitive advantage in revenue potential (see p. 6), 
revenue sharing can, in theory, promote competitive balance league-wide. This falls 
under the logical assumption that higher revenue allows a franchise to purchase more 
and/or better talent, which in turn enables the franchise to win more games. The second 
use of revenue sharing is to improve the profitability of all the franchises in a league.  
Most importantly, league-wide competitive balance is good for all teams.  Consumers are 
not attracted to sporting events in which the competitive outcomes are certain or close to 
certain.  Therefore, if a consumer is quite positive who will win a game, series or title, 
that consumer will not be engaged. 
 Although revenue sharing is a permanent tool in the major American 
leagues, it is under constant scrutiny and heavily debated.  Owners often complain about 
whether or not revenue sharing accomplishes its goals.  Some owners, for example 
George Steinbrenner of the New York Yankees, publicly question if revenue sharing is in 
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line with free market principles. Steinbrenner once said, “I'd like to see everybody 
competing, but we're not a socialist state.”1 In essence, large market teams cut checks 
from their operations and hand them to the league, which signs them over to small market 
teams.  In response to criticism over the Yankees exploitation of their large market 
advantages, Yankees President Randy Levine responded, “If we start getting refunds 
from the [luxury tax and revenue-sharing] checks we’ve been writing, then we’ll take 
those kind of complaints seriously.”2  
Apart from questions about the fairness of the revenue sharing method, many 
owners point out associated disincentives. John Henry, majority owner of the Boston Red 
Sox once said, “Baseball has to address the disincentives created by large scale transfers 
of revenue from successful clubs to less successful clubs.”3 The argument is sound: Why 
would small market owners improve their operations and product with the goal of 
improving profitability and competitiveness if they are rewarded for doing the opposite?  
Teams who win sparingly and have low revenues necessarily take much league-funding.   
Additionally, payrolls are the major cost to a team.  The easiest way for an owner to 
improve profitability in the short run is to minimize those costs.  Also worth 
consideration are the characteristics of team owners.  Forbes estimates that 2009 NBA 
Franchise Values ranged between $254 million (Milwaukee Bucks) and $607 million 
(Los Angeles Lakers) (see p. 7).  In order to purchase a team (or become partial owner), 
an individual must be extremely wealthy, and oftentimes, these owners are strictly 
interested in creating value and profitability rather than winning championships.  It is no 
surprise to see a team owner become highly profitable in the short run with low payroll 
                                                 
1 Bodley 
2 Brown 
3 "ESPN.com" 
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expenses and winning percentages.  Large market team owners have often objected to 
providing funds to small-market team owners who perform poorly in the business of 
sports.  Simultaneously, small market owners complain that they cannot compete without 
the same or more revenue sharing.  
   My work is based on one league in particular, the National Basketball 
Association (NBA).  The NBA is an interesting case for many reasons. Both historically 
and currently the league has the highest level of competitive imbalance compared to the 
other major US sports leagues (see p. 6).  Secondly, the NBA has recently begun to take 
revenue sharing very seriously.  Prior to 2008, the league relied only on annual luxury tax 
pool redistributions and the equal allocation of non-local media, sponsorship and 
merchandise revenue (BRI).  In 2008, the league increased its total annual revenue 
sharing to $49 million from $30 million, a boost of 63%.  This was funded by mandatory 
individual team contributions based on local revenues (in addition to BRI and luxury tax 
payments).  At the same time, the NBA hired McKinsey & Co. Consulting to create a 
new “complex” model to determine revenue sharing transfers and payments.4    
These recent changes come in the face of a salary cap and luxury tax threshold 
that appear ineffective in promoting competitive balance.  The NBA has a “soft cap,” 
meaning that teams can spend above the salary cap threshold (which was $58.68 million 
in the 2008-2009 season and $57.7 million in the 2009-2010 season)5 in order to resign 
their own players and acquire high-priced players through trades. There are many 
exceptions to the salary cap.  The most well known are the Bird Exception (after Larry 
Bird) and the Midlevel Salary Exception.  The Bird Exception allows teams go over the  
                                                 
4 Lombardo 
5 Coon 
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6"Forbes 2009 NBA Team Valuations" 
7 "U.S. Census Bureau" 
8 Maxwell 
Forbes 2009 NBA Team Valuations
Rank Team Current Value1 ($mil) 1-Yr Value Change (%) Debt/Value2 (%) Revenue3 ($mil) Operating Income4 ($mil)
1 Los Angeles Lakers 607 4 20 209 51.1
2 New York Knicks 586 -4 0 202 21
3 Chicago Bulls 511 2 11 168 51
4 Detroit Pistons 479 0 0 171 46.9
5 Cleveland Cavaliers 476 0 42 159 5
6 Houston Rockets 470 0 15 160 30.3
7 Dallas Mavericks 446 -4 26 154 -17.4
8 Boston Celtics 433 -3 42 144 12.9
9 Phoenix Suns 429 -5 43 148 20.7
10 San Antonio Spurs 398 -4 12 133 19.1
11 Toronto Raptors 386 -3 38 133 18
12 Miami Heat 364 -7 45 126 8
13 Orlando Magic 361 4 30 107 -2.2
14 Philadelphia 76ers 344 -4 19 115 7.6
15 Utah Jazz 343 -4 6 118 7.9
16 Portland Trail Blazers 338 10 31 121 -20.3
17 Denver Nuggets 321 -3 11 115 4.6
18 Golden State Warriors 315 -6 24 113 11.9
19 Washington Wizards 313 -11 62 110 4.9
20 Oklahoma City Thunde 310 3 45 111 12.7
21 Atlanta Hawks 306 0 21 103 -2
22 Sacramento Kings 305 -13 31 109 -2.8
23 Los Angeles Clippers 295 -1 0 102 10
24 Indiana Pacers 281 -7 18 97 -15.7
25 Charlotte Bobcats 278 -2 58 96 -15.1
26 New Jersey Nets 269 -9 77 92 -13.9
27 Minnesota Timberwolv 268 -11 19 96 -6.8
28 New Orleans Hornets 267 -6 55 95 -0.1
29 Memphis Grizzlies 257 -13 58 88 -7.1
30 Milwaukee Bucks 254 -9 22 91 -7.4
*Revenues and operating income are for 08-09 season and are net of revenue sharing.
1Value of team based on current arena deal (unless new arena is pending) without deduction for debt (other than arena debt).
2Includes arena debt.
3Net of arena revenues used for debt payments.
4Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.
9  
salary cap in order to re-sign “veteran” players (with the team for at least three years) to a 
league maximum salary.  The Midlevel extension allows a team to go over the cap to sign 
any free agent to the average NBA salary.   Additionally, the league has a “luxury tax” 
m
team
10
to prevent large-market teams from overspending.  For every dollar spent on payroll over 
the luxury tax threshold ($71.15 million in 2008-2009 season, $69.92 million in 2009-
2010 season), a team has to pay a dollar in taxes to the league. This tax level is set at 61% 
of projected basketball related income with minor adjustments.  Unfortunately, these 
easures are somewhat ineffective in keeping total payrolls close across the league.  
There are very few teams under the soft cap (two of thirty in 2008-2009 season) and 7-8 
s extend beyond the luxury tax threshold annually.  The New York Knicks and 
                                                 
9 "Forbes 2009 NBA Team Valuations" 
10 Coon 
 
 
7
Dallas Mavericks spent over the luxury-tax level by about $23 million each in the 2008-
2009 season. 
  In the NBA there exists a great disparity between the largest market teams and 
smalles
 small-market 
 teams to compete, you have to find another way. You have to hit the jackpot 
 
e summer free agency market of 2010 will offer an interesting 
backdro
competitive imbalance that already exists.   
                                                
t.  The New York Knicks, for example, spent $96,643,646 on payroll and had 
$208,000,000 in revenues for the 2008-2009 year.11 12  The Memphis Grizzlies, in 
comparison, spent $55,093,507 on payroll with $95,000,000 in revenues.13 14 In addition, 
the metro-statistical area populations of the largest market teams are ten-fold that of the 
smallest (see p.31). Memphis owner Michael Heisley said in early 2010,  
They don't use revenue sharing in this league. If they want
and get Lebron James (as Cleveland did in the 2003 draft). Then you have to 
 surround him with players, and you have a $100 million payroll and you 
 don't make money.15  
 
 Finally, th
p to my work.  During this time, the free agency market will be flooded with 
some of the greatest talent in the NBA, certainly more in an off-season than the league 
has seen before.  Some of the players available include Lebron James, Dwyane Wade, 
Ray Allen, Steve Nash, Rudy Gay, Chris Bosh, Amare Stoudemire and many others.  
Currently, teams are signing players with expiring contracts and clearing out payroll 
space to offer large contracts to these household names. It will be interesting to see how 
much money the large market teams will spend and if this widens the significant 
 
11 "Forbes 2009 NBA Team Valuations" 
12 "USA Today.com" 
13 "Forbes 2009 NBA Team Valuations" 
14 "USA Today.com" 
15 Tomasson 
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The Collective Bargaining Agreement expires on July 1, 2011.  Beginning in 
August 2009, the Players Association and League Ownership have met multiple times to 
discuss
nt and more accurate in accomplishing the goals it is in place for: a 
ompet
                                                
 a new “CBA,” but all meetings have been completely unsuccessful and 
contentuous.  David Stern claimed the league lost $400 million in fiscal 2009. 16 This 
adds another level of complexity to the NBA’s strong commitment to their current 
revenue sharing tools and systems. In his All-Star Weekend 2010 Press Conference, 
David Stern stated, “I am determined to actually change the revenue sharing model in the 
NBA as well… our goal, for our teams, our players and particularly for our fans, is to 
come up with a model that says ‘Every NBA team can compete.’”17 Revenue sharing, 
according to Stern’s claims, is not only contributing to the league’s serious losses, but it 
is also ineffective in creating competitive balance. It is likely that revenue sharing, 
whether in method or contribution amounts, will change in the new Collective Bargaining 
Agreement. 
 The goal of my work, therefore, has been to create a revenue sharing model that is 
more efficie
c itive, profitable league.   It is the main focus of my work to consider alternative 
metrics for each team besides simply total revenues and population (which the NBA 
currently focuses on) for revenue sharing receipts.  By considering other factors, one can 
confidently observe how well a franchise is attempting to improve both team quality and 
profitability.  From this, we have a revenue sharing model that eliminates those 
disincentives that exist.   
 
16 “David Stern Press Conference" 
17 "David Stern Press Conference" 
 
 
9
 In this paper, I have created a “scorecard” system (similar to a grading system) in 
which I evaluate each NBA franchise from 2004-2009 on how well each has attempted to 
prov
rofessional sports, 
eterm
im e their competitiveness as well as how each has performed financially.  This is a 
three part scorecard.  Part 1 is a system of Ticket Price Models.  Statistical regression and 
econometrics are used to determine how well each team has priced their tickets and 
therefore, maximized gate revenue controlling for a number of factors including team 
quality and market population.  Part 2 is a system of Payroll Models in which I consider 
whether a team is spending enough on their Payroll relative to a number of other factors 
including market size.  Part 3 is an Owner Performance Measure in which I examine 
some proxies of publicly available data to determine if an owner is earning high revenues 
relative to a number of factors.  These three parts will combine to form the “Efficient 
Evaluation Scorecard.”  Unfortunately, we cannot be sure how much each franchise has 
contributed and received from annual revenue sharing because it is private information.  
This scorecard does not attempt to determine whether or not the league has contributed 
the correct amount to each franchise.  Rather, this scorecard gives models, measurements 
and proxies based on publicly available data to determine which small (and large) market 
teams have earned their revenue sharing receipts and which have not. 
 In the next section of this paper, I will discuss relevant literature to my work.  
These papers concern revenue sharing and its effectiveness in p
d ination of efficient revenue sharing receipts, and applied econometric variables 
and methods.  Next, I will go into specific details on my econometric models and my 
Efficient Evaluation Scorecard.  Following, I will highlight the relevance of all data used 
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in the work.  Finally, I will display the results of each of my models and discuss how they 
have allowed me to evaluate owner performance and create a more efficient metric. 
 
Section II – Literature Review and Discussion 
 empirical studies on the topic of 
revenue
                                                
 
a) Competitive Balance and Revenue Sharing Success 
 
There is an immense wealth of theoretical and
 sharing and its effect on competitive balance in professional sports leagues.  
Although there is still much debate about the effect and its necessary circumstances, 
many papers have argued about the positive effects of some form of revenue sharing on a 
league’s health.  Most importantly, Commissioner David Stern and the NBA truly believe 
in this.  To begin, Rottenberg (1956)18 argues that without some form of revenue sharing 
or labor restrictions, large teams will acquire the best players, competitive balance will be 
low and competitive outcomes will become too predictable and steer fans away. Fort and 
Quirk (1995)19 make observations of gate revenue sharing in the presence of local TV 
revenues.  They find that if franchises earn unshared local TV revenues, then sharing of 
other revenues will cause a change in competitive balance.  This is critical, as it 
recognizes a separation between important TV revenues and all other revenues.  Rascher 
(1997)20 argues that revenue sharing has no effect on player distribution and competitive 
balance under profit-maximization.  Building on these findings, Kesenne (2000)21 makes 
the argument that revenue sharing can improve competitive balance in both profit-
maximization and utility-maximization scenarios.  In other words, revenue sharing can be 
effective in its goals of even talent distribution and competitive balance if an owner both 
 
18 Rottenberg (1956), 242 
19 Fort & Quirk (1995), 1265 
20 Rascher (1997), 27 
21 Kesenne(2000), 56 
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looks to maximize profits and receives utility from his team.  If owners want their teams 
to win, revenue sharing will work. 
More recently, Kesenne (2007)22 argues that it is difficult to determine revenue 
sharing
ke certain assumptions in the following 
work.  
                                                
’s effect on the ownership profits of large-market clubs (high revenue clubs).  
Alternately, we can be sure that it improves profitability of small market clubs.  Finally, 
Miller (2007)23 finds, in observing free agency, that revenue sharing is ineffective if an 
insufficient portion is taken from high-revenue clubs.  Additionally rewarding “quality” 
low-revenue clubs can improve competitive balance (and the ability for a team to sign 
free agents) and revenue sharing can improve competitive balance by allowing small 
market franchises to acquire marginal players.   
The highlighted literature is used to ma
Firstly, it is assumed that purchasing talent will improve competitive balance.  
This paper will not look deeply into effective evaluation of talent (as this would be an 
analysis of player performance and General Manager ability.) It will assume that higher 
payroll spending reflects a team’s attempt to improve its quality and competitive ability.  
Secondly, it has been shown that revenue sharing augments profitability for small market 
franchises.  These are both stated goals of the NBA.  Finally, I assume that revenue 
sharing improves talent distribution/competitive balance in a system where an owner 
receives consumption value from his/her team.  All franchise owners aim to be highly 
profitable, but absent ones, who care little about the success of his/her team, are harmful 
to the revenue sharing system.  When we see franchise owners spend insufficiently on 
 
22 Kesenne(2007), 519 
23 Miller(2007), 62 
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payroll (and perhaps care little about the team that he/she owns), we are reminded of this 
important detail. 
Unfortunately, there have been few attempts to create an efficient revenue sharing 
model for a league or all the major leagues collectively.  This is because the leagues pay 
for this type of work.  One model that can be studied from a distance was created by 
McKinsey & Co. Consulting for the NBA.  Although this model is private and 
inaccessible, we can infer from articles written about it.  Sports Business Journal released 
an article stating that the model focuses on a team’s media deal relative to its market size 
as well as the number of team sponsors relative to the corporate base as major factors in 
determining receipts.24 There is little additional detail available.  We assume, though, that 
in the NBA today, a team’s revenue sharing receipts are mostly a function of a team’s 
total revenue and population.   
Michael Lewis, author of the New York Times Bestseller “Moneyball,” offers an 
alternative method to today’s revenue sharing agreement in a paper published in 2008.  
Lewis, who is an Assistant Professor of Marketing affiliated with The Olin Business 
School at Washington University, argues that revenue sharing as it exists today 
“decreases the incentives for small market teams to remain competitive.”25 Lewis, 
arguably, does little to build on revenue sharing papers written before him and offers 
minimal empirical evidence of his thoughts.  Interestingly though, he comes to a very 
important conclusion: revenue sharing payments across leagues should not be based on a 
team’s revenue streams.  This contributes directly to owner disincentives.  As an 
alternative, Lewis offers an over-simplified solution that is remarkable for considering 
                                                 
24 Lombardo 
25 Lewis(2008), 547 
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how to avoid the disincentive problem.  He notes, “A potential approach would be to base 
revenue sharing on a combination of market size and higher attendance rates.”  In 
addition to variables for population, winning percentage and cost of living, Lewis uses 
the following variable in his model: 
 
βrs x (LFt/Pop^2) 
 
In this variable, “LFt” stands for Load Factor, or the average annual attendance as a 
proportion of capacity.  “Pop^2” is the square of the local market population.  βrs, on the 
other hand, is a positive quantity based on the degree of revenue sharing desired.  
Therefore, if a league would like to see a “high” level, then this should be a larger 
value.26  Lewis squares the population term in his expression to illustrate that the load 
factor is significantly more important for small market teams.  For example, the Boston 
Red Sox (relatively large market, high revenue) would not benefit from a 95% load factor 
to the extent the Kansas City Royals (small market, low revenue) would.  A large 
denominator would lower the revenue sharing receipt.   
Lewis’ model is a weak, but telling attempt to eliminate disincentives.  It refutes 
revenue as a basis for determination and replaces it with attendance capacity.  
Unfortunately, attendance capacity is too simple.  Gate revenue is only 1/3 of a team’s 
total revenue.  It is possible for an owner to be performing well in raising revenues 
without emphasizing game attendance. For example, in the NBA, the Houston Rockets 
had the 6th highest revenue in 2007-2008 at $156 million, yet had a total attendance of 
718,524 for the year, the 16th highest.   Additionally, some areas have a difficult time 
                                                 
26 Lewis(2008), 541-546 
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getting fans regardless of ticket prices.  If enacted, any team could lower its ticket prices 
far enough to achieve close to 100% capacity over a season (or potentially give away 
unsold tickets).  These teams could be charging too little for the tickets and raking in 
lower revenues.   
 
b) Literature Used For Modeling 
 I) Ticket Price Model 
 In addition to papers about the effects of revenue sharing on competitive balance 
and talent distribution, many papers study the determinants of ticket prices.  Rishe & 
Mondello (2004), in a paper specifically addressing the pricing in the four major sports 
leagues, offer a basic set of determinants. Of particular notice is their use of the variable 
“CAP” or previous year’s average attendance as a percentage of total stadium capacity. 
This is very logical, as the laws of supply and demand recognize a necessary relationship 
between ticket pricing and ability to fill seats.  They also use the variable “PAY” or 
payroll, under the assumption that a franchise should charge higher tickets if it puts more 
talent on the court.  In addition, the paper acknowledges population as a proxy for 
demand. 27 These variables are employed in my ticket price models. 
 Berri, Schmidt & Brook (2004) explore the effect of superstars and all-stars on 
NBA gate revenue. They argue that although we assume that competitive balance is the 
most important aspect driving consumer demand, star players are also important in 
attracting fans.  The following models employ this logic and utilize multiple measures of 
“star-power” as determinants of ticket prices and gate revenues.28 Henrickson (2007), in 
                                                 
27 Rishe & Mondello (2004), 106, 111 
28 Berri, Schmidt & Brook (2004) , 33 
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a paper about the effects of franchise relocations on ticket prices and profits, focuses on 
the idea of spatial competition.  He notes that in reality, the level of competition between 
sports teams (in terms of selling their product) is a concern of physical distance.  The 
number of relevant alternatives in proximity dictates the profits a franchise can earn.29 I 
use his analysis by adding an independent variable in some of my models measuring 
alternative major sports in an NBA team’s metro-statistical area. 
 ii.) Payroll Model 
 Although there is little theoretical or empirical literature building a payroll model, 
Rascher & Rascher (2004) give an empirical study of the viability of U.S. cities for 
expansion or relocation NBA franchises.  Some of the independent variables in 
determining a city’s ability to sustain a franchise can be applied to a model explaining a 
team’s payroll.  For example, the paper considers the number of Fortune 500 companies 
in a city as a measure of business activity and business wealth.  The paper also considers 
the “fanaticism” of the local population and a recreation value of the local area.30  Both 
of these independents affect a franchise’s payroll spending decisions.   
                                                
   
 
 
29 Henrickson(2007), 1-29 
30 Rascher & Rascher (2004), 281 
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Section III – Model Description and Nature of Analysis 
a.) Ticket Price Model 
 
 The Ticket Price Model, also known as the Revenue Model, is a common 
econometric analysis used to predict average ticket prices.  This is an important measure 
to show how well a franchise is pricing their product.  Additionally, Ticket  
Price Models prove essential because gate revenues (received from ticket sales), average 
around 30-40% of total team revenues.  Therefore, such significant component must be 
priced correctly. 
 Average ticket price data is gathered for each team over the 2004-2009 seasons 
and regressed against multiple independent variables.  Since tickets are essentially one 
“product” that an NBA owner is selling, it is important to recognize that there are many 
factors contributing to a fan’s willingness or ability to pay certain prices.  As displayed 
on p. 35, five different models are highlighted.  From these, predicted values and 
residuals for each team and season are calculated.  These predicted values are then 
averaged for each NBA franchise spanning the 2004 to 2009 seasons.  Essentially, this 
analysis uses five different models to affirm my results.  Models (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10) 
are highlighted with the most focus placed on model (10) as the strongest explanatory 
method for pricing effectiveness. The logic is as follows: if a dependent variable is 
regressed against different sets and combinations of independent variables and the 
predicted values are somewhat similar, then we can be confident in the results.  Success 
in pricing tickets, according to this model, is proximity of actual ticket prices to predicted 
values.  Therefore, both large positive and large negative residuals are considered poor 
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pricing performance. Both undercharging and overcharging for tickets are considered 
ineffective in maximizing gate revenue. 
 The Ticket Price Models are meant to include several factors that might influence 
a ticket’s price.  We assume that ticket prices for a season are set before the season 
begins, and therefore, most independent variables are lagged (fortunately, 
payroll/personnel decisions are made around the same time).  We will consider Ticket 
Price Model (10) displayed on p. 36.   
 One set of independent variables is team quality, which can be observed in 
different ways for an NBA team. In this model, average winning percentage over the 
previous three seasons is used.31  To capture a team’s history of winning championships, 
the number of NBA Championships won over the past twenty seasons is also used. We 
expect a positive relationship between both championships won and ticket prices and 
winning percentages and ticket prices. To observe player quality, this model considers a 
“superstar” dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the team has any of the following 
players: Dwyane Wade, Lebron James, Kobe Bryant, Carmelo Anthony, Kevin Durant, 
Dwight Howard.  These are considered the most popular, most effective and most 
exciting players in the NBA. A team can charge higher prices if they employ a player that 
is of the elite in the league.  In most cases, these are also the players leading the league in 
scoring every year.  Additionally, we examine the number of All-Star years on a roster.  
This means that each team’s roster’s combined All-Star Team appearances are tallied for 
this measure.  Since All-Star selections are based solely on fan-voting, one can see a clear 
connection between an All-Star’s popularity and a consumer’s willingness to pay higher 
prices to watch him. Performance statistics are also a subset of team quality.  In model 
                                                 
31 Data specifics and sources are highlighted in Section IV 
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(10), we use the measures of Effective Field Goal Percentage, Defensive Effective Field 
Goal Percentage and Pace defined by basketballreference.com.  These measures serve as 
team statistics for offensive ability, defensive ability and style of play.  Effective and 
Defensive Effective Field Goal Percentage are metrics to measure shots made vs. shots 
taken, while pace is a statistic that determines a team’s speed of play.   
 Another set of independents is demographic characteristics because gate prices 
are necessarily a function of the market’s attributes.  All demographic data is at the 
metro-statistical area (MSA) level.  To begin, the model includes population and 
population squared to capture non-linear population effects.  Cost of Living is included, 
which is calculated by taking a recent MSA comparison of cost of living and indexing 
these values back in time based on changes in MSA housing prices.  Also used are 
stadium characteristics, such as attendance capacity and a stadium dummy equal to 1 if a 
new stadium was built in the previous five years.  Attendance capacity is important 
because pricing is affected by the laws of supply and demand, and this measure calculates 
the average percent of a team’s stadium filled throughout the season.  Included is a metric 
to determine if the franchise has been an expansion team in the previous five years, in 
which we expect to see a potentially positive relationship due to the “honeymoon effect,” 
or a team’s early popularity in a new city.  Finally, included are dummy variables for the 
New York/New Jersey Nets, Los Angeles Clippers, the Golden State Warriors and the 
years 2004-2009.  The Nets and Clippers share markets with other historic franchises 
(Knicks and Lakers) and it is difficult to determine how effectively they price.  
Additionally, demographic information for the San Francisco Bay area cannot be 
 
 
19
separated between Oakland and San Francisco/Berkeley, and therefore, this information 
is not representative of the actual fan base.   
 
b.) Payroll Model 
 The Payroll Model is an econometric analysis used to predict the amount an NBA 
franchise should be spending on their total player payroll.  The NBA front office and 
league officials expect each franchise to spend as much as possible on their payrolls 
(given the franchise’s demographic characteristics) to increase competitive balance.  In 
considering revenue sharing, the league demands that teams spend their payments on 
payroll to purchase more talent/increase their talent level and competitiveness rather than 
pocket the money.  This is extremely important for small-market franchises who receive 
the highest receipts.  In this way, this model is a direct regression analysis to determine if 
a team is attempting to improve their product. 
 On page 41, models (5), (8), (9), (11) and (16) are highlighted for focus.  Using 
these models, annual predicted values have been calculated for each team in seasons 2004 
through 2009.  The predicted values and residuals have been averaged over this period 
for each team.  From this, there are predicted values from each model for each franchise 
to compare results.  The logic, similar to the Ticket Price Model, is that if we can observe 
similar predicted values in models with different combinations of independent variables 
regressed on Payroll (the dependent variable), then we can be confident that the predicted 
values from each model are accurate predictions for each franchise.  Success is not 
proximity to the mean predicted values (as was the case in the Ticket Price Model) but 
having a positive (even if large) residual.  Since the league prefers each team to be 
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spending accordingly rather than severely under-spending on payroll (as it is beneficial 
for the league as a whole to have a high level of competitive balance), the greater the 
difference between a franchise’s mean payroll and predicted values, the better they 
manage payroll spending.  In other words, if a franchise’s actual payroll is lower than 
what the model predicts their spending should be, then they are not enough buying 
enough talent. 
 Similar to the Ticket Price Model, most of the independent variables for the 
Payroll Model are previous year data.  This is because payroll decisions are made before 
the season begins.  Determinants of a franchise’s combined payroll are heavily 
demographic; since payroll is the major expense, an NBA owner must be confident that 
he/she will earn sufficient revenues and high profits.  We will focus on Payroll Model 
(16) on p. 42 as the preferred model because it accounts for as many significant variables 
as possible.  
 The first set of independents is demographic statistics.  All demographic statistics 
are at the metro statistical area (MSA) level because we consider a team’s local fanbase 
as extending beyond the associated city and/or arena.  Included in Payroll Model (16) are 
population and population squared to allow for non-linear population effects.  Population 
is important in payroll decisions because the size of the local market influences the 
amount of revenue that could be earned.  Also included is population growth rate because 
an owner may decide to spend differently depending on how the local population has 
been growing.  An owner, seeing a declining MSA population, may notice a trend of 
departing customers and thus expect lower total revenues.  This would create little 
incentive to increase payroll.  Per capita income is used as a proxy of an area’s individual 
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wealth, and per capita income squared is used to allow for non-linear “PCI” effects.  We 
expect higher per capita income to be associated with higher average ticket prices.  Also 
used are Cost of living and cost of living squared.  
 The next set of independents is business and fan characteristics.  Included in 
Payroll Model (16) is the number of Fortune 500 companies in the MSA.  Large 
companies are an important source of revenue for an NBA franchise.  Franchises depend 
heavily on ticket revenue from expensive floor seats, luxury box leases and season ticket 
packages. Because large firms are the main purchasers of these, an owner must consider 
potential and expected revenue from local corporations.  The Fanaticism Index is a 
number associated with every American city to value a population’s “fan-hood”, or in 
other words, how much a population cares about professional and collegiate athletic 
competition.  Alternative Sports is used to represent the number of additional 
professional sports teams in the MSA.  These additional teams belong to the major sports 
leagues (NFL, NBA, NHL, MLB).  If a city has multiple NBA teams, the additional NBA 
team is given a value of 1.  If there are eight additional teams sharing a franchise’s MSA 
(like the tri-state area of New York, Connecticut and New Jersey), the value is eight.  
Like demographic variables, a team’s stadium capacity can be positively related to their 
payroll spending, as a larger stadium gives a franchise the opportunity to earn higher gate 
revenues by seating more fans.  Therefore, stadium capacity is included in the model.   
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c.) Owner Performance Valuation 
 The Owner Performance Valuation is a method in which an owner’s front office 
operations, media product and venue revenue efforts and successes are evaluated.  
Although Payroll Models and Ticket Price Models are extremely important, there are 
other efforts made by an NBA franchise with the objective of improving profitability and/ 
or being more competitive.  This valuation seeks to consider how much revenue (outside 
of ticket sales) a team can earn in their venue from concessions and advertising.  
Additionally, in the changing landscape of television, the NBA has become increasingly 
reliant on TV revenues as a source of profits.  Also noteworthy is a team’s ability to 
improve its value through its brand image.  The Owner Performance Valuation is not an 
all-inclusive guide to determine how well an owner performs outside of gate revenue and 
payroll spending.  Rather, this valuation aims to use publicly available estimates, 
information and data to give some clarity on the above efforts. 
 The “Venue Revenue” valuation considers arena sponsorship revenues with the 
logic that if an owner negotiates a good stadium advertising deal, the franchise will earn 
higher annual advertising revenues and potentially higher profits.  For a team that plays 
in a venue with no stadium name, a quick and popular way to increase revenue is to sell 
naming rights.  Franchises that compete in venues owned by others (or those that have no 
ability to sell naming rights) are valued at “n/a” in this area.  Revenue Per Fan/PCI is a 
measure of in-stadium revenues (excluding tickets) that a team can earn at its home 
games.  This values a franchise’s ability to sell merchandise, apparel and food/beverages.  
Attendance capacity increases from 2004-2008 demonstrates if a team has improved its 
attendance.  Although this issue is tackled in the Ticket Price Model, the NBA has had a 
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particular focus on improving attendance league-wide, and thus higher attendance rates 
are in line with league goals. 
 “Media Product” determines if a team is able to sell its product through the media 
and on TV.   This is essential as local and national TV revenue are extremely profitable 
for all franchises. TV Ratings and TV Households are 2009 regional sports network 
ratings corresponding to individual franchises. All but 4 teams are on regional sports 
networks. Multiplying these metrics together and dividing them into the total national TV 
revenues contractually received by the NBA in 2009 equals Share of NBA TV Revenue 
(measured in millions).  This gives us a monetary value associated with a franchise’s TV 
product. 
 “Front Office Product” considers how successful a team’s front office operations 
have been.  Brand Management/Team Value is an estimate from Forbes NBA Valuations.  
This measure seeks to determine if a team has been able to sell its brand and how 
valuable that brand is compared to its entire franchise value.  Therefore, a team with 
successful marketing, public relations, and community relations operations should expect 
to see a high value.  Win-Payer Cost ratio is a metric used to value the success of a 
team’s general management. This measure “compares the number of wins per player 
payroll relative to the rest of the NBA.”32 This paper does not seek to evaluate the best 
way to spend money, but a franchise’s ability to win and spend resourcefully must be 
considered.  
                                                 
32 "Forbes 2009 NBA Team Valuations" 
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Section IV - Discussion of Data 
1.) Data Classes   
 
a) Demographic Data 
 
PopP – Previous year’s population within 50 miles of team’s stadium, taken from 
Professor Chris Maxwell’s “Population Bands” database.33 Population bands based on 
2000 US Census.  Bands are then indexed to each respective Metro-Statistical Area 
population increase for each year from 2002-2009.34  Annual MSA populations taken 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.35 Note that 2009 population data does not exist, 
therefore, this is forecasted by increasing population by the same % increase from the 
previous year. 
 
PopP2 – “PopP” * “PopP” 
 
PopP3 – ln (“PopP” +1) 
 
PopGR – Population Growth Rate of the previous season year.  Calculated by taking the 
rate of increase of “PopP”36 in year t-2 to year t-1. 
 
pci – Real per capita income from previous year.  Nominal PCI data of local MSA taken 
from Bureau of Economic Analysis.37 The annual data is then indexed to the CPI 
multiplier.38 
 
pci2 – “pci” * “pci” 
 
rcolibprev (col) – Real cost of living in previous year.  Cost of living value is a regional 
comparison in 2009 from www.payscale.com.39 I then decided to index the values back 
annually to changes in the Real MSA Housing Price Index40 from the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency. Although real MSA annual cost of living data does not exist, this is the 
most accurate approach because housing prices are a large component of cost of living. 
Based on housing prices in Q4 of previous year. 
 
col2 – “rcolibprev” * “rcolibprev” 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Maxwell 
34 "U.S. Census Bureau" 
35 "Regional Economic Information Systems" 
36 "Regional Economic Information Systems" 
37 "Regional Economic Information Systems" 
38 "United States Department of Labor" 
39 "Payscale Cost of Living Calculator" 
40 "Federal Housing Finance Agency" 
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b) Team Data 
 
PayrollB (payrollp) – Total team payroll from the previous year.  Based on annual data 
published by USA Today.41 
 
tixprice2 – Team’s average ticket price in the current season. From sports economist 
Rodney Fort’s ticket price database42, whose ticket price data are based on the Team 
Marketing Report Database.43 
 
winprev – Regular season winning percentage in the previous season.  Data from 
www.basketball-reference.com.44  
 
winprev3 – Average winning percentage over the previous 3 seasons. Calculated by 
averaging individual season winning percentages from www.basketball-reference.com45  
 
pbirthprev – Dummy variable = 1 if the team qualified for the playoffs in the previous 
season. Individual season playoff appearance data taken from www.basketball-
reference.com. 46 
 
pbirthprev2 - # of playoff births over the previous 2 seasons. Calculated by using 
individual season playoff appearance data taken from www.basketball-reference.com. 47 
 
pbirthprev3 -  # of playoff births over the previous 3 seasons. Calculated by using 
individual season playoff appearance data taken from www.basketball-reference.com. 48 
.  
champsprev5 – # of NBA championships won over previous 5 seasons. Calculated by 
using individual season championship data taken from www.basketball-reference.com. 49 
 
champsprev10 – # of NBA championships won over previous 10 seasons. Calculated by 
using individual season championship data taken from www.basketball-reference.com. 50 
 
champsprev20 – # of NBA championships won over previous 20 seasons. Calculated by 
using individual season championship data taken from www.basketball-reference.com. 51 
 
ChampV – Championship Valuation (Berri, Schmidt & Brook, 2004).  “This calculation 
involved assigning a value to a team for each championships won in the past 20 years. 
                                                 
41 "USA Today.com" 
42 Fort 
43 "Team Market Report" 
44 "Basketball-Reference.com" 
45 "Basketball-Reference.com" 
46 "Basketball-Reference.com" 
47 "Basketball-Reference.com" 
48 "Basketball-Reference.com" 
49 "Basketball-Reference.com" 
50 "Basketball-Reference.com" 
51 "Basketball-Reference.com" 
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This value was 20 if the team captured a championship during the prior season, 19 if the 
championship was won two seasons past, and so forth.”  52 
 
allstaryrs – Combined number of career all-star appearances for each player on previous 
season’s roster.  Calculated for each team in each season.  Annual All-Star Team rosters 
taken from www.basketball-reference.com. 53 
 
supstar – “NBA Superstar” dummy variable = 1 if team has one of the following players 
on previous season’s roster: Dwayne Wade, Lebron James, Kobe Bryant, Carmelo 
Anthony, Kevin Durant, Dwight Howard.  
 
c) Team Game Statistics 
 
efg0 – Effective Field Goal Percentage of previous season. Used as a more telling 
valuation of a team’s offensive ability than field goal percentage or points scored per 
game. “The formula is (FG + 0.5 * 3P) / FGA. This statistic adjusts for the fact that a 3-
point field goal is worth one more point than a 2-point field goal. For example, suppose 
Player A goes 4 for 10 with 2 threes, while Player B goes 5 for 10 with 0 threes. Each 
player would have 10 points from field goals, and thus would have the same effective 
field goal percentage (50%).” From www.basketball-reference.com. 54 
 
defg0 – Defensive Effective Field Goal Percentage of previous season. Used as a more 
telling valuation of a team’s defensive ability than defensive field goal percentage or 
points allowed per game.  From www.basketball-reference.com. 55 
 
pace -  Pace Factor of previous season, used to represent speed of play, and therefore, 
attractiveness of style of play.   “The formula is 48 * ((Tm Poss + Opp Poss) / (2 * (Tm 
MP / 5))). Pace factor is an estimate of the number of possessions per 48 minutes by a 
team.”  From www.basketball-reference.com. 56 
 
drtg – Defensive Rating of previous season.  Points allowed per 100 possessions. From 
www.basketball-reference.com. 57 
 
ortg – Offensive Rating of previous season. Points scored per 100 possessions. From 
www.basketball-reference.com. 58 
 
 
 
 
d) Population/City Characteristics 
                                                 
52 Berri, Schmidt & Brook (2004) , 36 
53 "Basketball-Reference.com" 
54 "Basketball-Reference.com" 
55 "Basketball-Reference.com" 
56 "Basketball-Reference.com" 
57 "Basketball-Reference.com" 
58 "Basketball-Reference.com" 
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f500msa - # of Fortune 500 Companies in metro statistical area from previous year.  From 
www.cincinattichamber.com for year 2008.59 Data unavailable for other years, therefore 
assumed static for 2004-2009. 
 
F500c – # of Fortune 500 Companies in the city a stadium is located in (from previous 
year). Compiled for each season. From Fortune 500 list at 
www.money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/.60 
 
altsport – alternative major sports (NFL, NBA, NFL, MLB) teams in MSA or same 
market.  Values complied manually. Additional NBA teams in market also counted for 
New York and Los Angeles. 
 
Rfanat – Fanaticism Index used by Rascher & Rascher (2004). Data set given to me by 
paper’s authors.61 Used to measure fan quality of MSA/city of team’s location. Note: 
Oklahoma City Thunder value is average of all other NBA city values. 
 
e) Stadium Characteristics 
 
attendcap – Average % of attendance to stadium capacity over previous season (for home 
games) Calculated by taking total attendance from Rodney Fort’s attendance database 62, 
dividing by 41 (the number of total home games per season).  Then divided into total 
stadium capacity, from www.basketball.ballparks.com.63 
 
Atten – Total home-game attendance from previous season, from Rodney Fort’s 
database64. Note: Oklahoma City Thunder 2008 attendance = 2009 attendance (08-09 
was first season).  
                                                
 
Capac - Total stadium capacity, from www.basketball.ballparks.com .65 
 
stad – dummy = 1 if current stadium was built in the past five years. Compiled by 
observing stadium opening dates taken from www.basketball.ballparks.com. 66 
 
relex – Dummy = 1 if team is a relocation/expansion team in the previous year.  
Compiled by observing teams’ inaugural seasons in new cities at www.basketball-
reference.com. 67 
 
 
59 "Cincinnati USA" 
60 "Fortune" 
61 Rascher & Rascher (2004), 281 
62 Fort 
63 Suppes, and Munsey 
64 Fort 
65 Suppes & Munsey 
66 Suppes & Munsey 
67 "Basketball-Reference.com" 
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expan3 – Dummy = 1 if team is an expansion franchise in the previous 3 years.  
Compiled by observing teams’ inaugural seasons at www.basketball-reference.com. 68 
 
f) Dummies 
 
A2009 – dummy = 1 if 2009 season. 
A2008 – dummy = 1 if 2008 season. 
A2007 – dummy = 1 if 2007 season. 
A2006 – dummy = 1 if 2006 season. 
A2005 – dummy = 1 if 2005 season. 
A2004 – dummy = 1 if 2004 season. 
 
gs – Dummy = 1 if Golden State Warriors.  
Clip – Dummy = 1 if Los Angeles Clippers 
Nets - Dummy = 1 if New York/New Jersey Clippers 
 
g) Owner Performance Data 
 
Brand Management Value – “Portion of franchise's value attributable to the management 
of its brand”69  Value taken from Forbes NBA Team Valuations at www.forbes.com.  
Values only observed for the 2008-2009 season for consistency. 
 
Team Value – Projected Total Franchise Value for the 2008-2009 season.  Taken from 
Forbes NBA Team Valuations at www.forbes.com70. 
 
Win-to-Player Cost Ratio – “Compares the number of wins per player payroll relative to 
the rest of the NBA. Postseason wins count twice as much as regular season wins. A 
score of 120 means that the team achieved 20% more victories per dollar of payroll 
compared with the league average.” 71 Data only exists for the 2008-2009 season.  Taken 
from Forbes NBA Team Valuations at www.forbes.com. 
 
TV Ratings –2009 regional sports network TV ratings, by NBA franchise.  A proxy for 
local TV ratings. Compiled by www.sportsbusinessjournal.com.72 
 
TV Households –2009 regional sports networks total TV household viewership, by NBA 
franchise.  Compiled by www.sportsbusinessjournal.com.73 
 
Share of NBA TV Revenue – “TV Ratings” * “TV Households”/Total NBA TV Revenue 
Contracts.  TV Revenue data compiled by Rodney Fort’s “TV Revenues” database74, 
reported initially by www.sportsbusiness.com.75 
                                                 
68 "Basketball-Reference.com" 
69 "Forbes 2009 NBA Team Valuations" 
70 "Forbes 2009 NBA Team Valuations" 
71 "Forbes 2009 NBA Team Valuations" 
72 Lombardo, and Ourand 1 
73 Lombardo, and Ourand 1 
74 Fort 
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Arena Sponsorship Revenues – Reported dollar value of annual arena sponsorship.  
Compiled and reported by Marquette University National Sports Law Institute at www. 
law.marquette.edu.76 
 
Revenue Per Fan/PCI – Estimated 2009 local revenue per fan/per capita income or “pci” 
for 2009. “Arena and local media revenue generated per person in the metro area. 
Populations are adjusted for the number of teams in their metro area.”77  Taken From 
Forbes NBA Team Valuations at www.forbes.com. 
 
Attendance Capacity Increase ’04-’08 – change in “attendcap” from 2004 – 2008 
seasons. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
75 Lombardo, and Ourand 1 
76 "Marquette University Law School" 
77 "Forbes 2009 NBA Team Valuations" 
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2.) Data Considerations 
 
 There are major differences in the data between different NBA teams.  The 
following table depicts some of the variations in MSA population and total annual 
revenues.  As you can see, the population of the lowest population team is 10% that of 
the largest (Oklahoma City vs. New York City).  Additionally, the lowest revenue is only 
42% of the largest (Memphis vs. Los Angeles Lakers).  These are clearly significant 
disparities, and the market factors that small market teams must overcome are major.  
Additionally, it is notable that financial statements (balance sheets, income statements, 
cash flow statements) for NBA franchises are completely inaccessible by the public.  This 
data could be effectively used in some of the models outlined.  Forbes, though, compiles 
annual estimates of team values, revenues and costs for each franchise. This model will 
not examine the Toronto Raptors because we cannot compare non-US demographic data. 
If Revenue Sharing Receipts were based on - 
Total Annual Revenues: Total MSA Population:
Rank Team Revenue ($mil) Rank Team Population
1 Memphis Grizzlies 88 1 Oklahoma City Thunder 1,332,803
2 Milwaukee Bucks 91 2 New Orleans Hornets 1,364,419
3 New Jersey Nets 92 3 Memphis Grizzlies 1,411,775
4 New Orleans Hornets 95 4 Utah Jazz 2,060,925
5 Charlotte Bobcats 96 5 San Antonio Spurs 2,123,293
6 Minnesota Timberwolves 96 6 Milwaukee Bucks 2,239,507
7 Indiana Pacers 97 7 Indiana Pacers 2,424,835
8 Los Angeles Clippers 102 8 Portland Trail Blazers 2,676,865
9 Atlanta Hawks 103 9 Charlotte Bobcats 2,799,081
10 Orlando Magic 107 10 Sacramento Kings 2,986,730
11 Sacramento Kings 109 11 Cleveland Cavaliers 3,241,018
12 Washington Wizards 110 12 Minnesota Timberwolves 3,422,887
13 Oklahoma City Thunder 111 13 Orlando Magic 3,443,157
14 Golden State Warriors 113 14 Denver Nuggets 3,894,008
15 Denver Nuggets 115 15 Phoenix Suns 4,328,613
16 Philadelphia 76ers 115 16 Miami Heat 4,655,926
17 Utah Jazz 118 17 Detroit Pistons 5,353,627
18 Portland Trail Blazers 121 18 Atlanta Hawks 5,648,314
19 Miami Heat 126 19 Houston Rockets 5,724,346
20 San Antonio Spurs 133 20 New Jersey Nets 5,933,435
21 Boston Celtics 144 21 Dallas Mavericks 6,357,889
22 Phoenix Suns 148 22 Golden State Warriors 6,583,043
23 Dallas Mavericks 154 23 Boston Celtics 6,679,892
24 Cleveland Cavaliers 159 24 Philadelphia 76ers 7,056,148
25 Houston Rockets 160 25 Los Angeles Clippers 7,263,815
26 Chicago Bulls 168 26 Los Angeles Lakers 7,263,815
27 Detroit Pistons 171 27 Washington Wizards 7,992,911
 
 
3128 New York Knicks 202 28 Chicago Bulls 9,297,18729 Los Angeles Lakers 209 29 New York Knicks 13,133,172
Ticket Price Model Data Summary 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
year 204 2003 2009
tixprice2 173 $49.44 $13.32 $24.11 $93.25
wincur 144 50.20% 14.56% 15.90% 81.70%
winprev 172 50.29% 14.45% 15.90% 81.70%
winprev3 172 50.14% 11.73% 22.00% 75.20%
pbirthcur 173 0.54 0.50 0 1
pbirthprev 172 0.55 0.50 0 1
pbirthprev2 173 1.63 1.14 0 3
pbirthprev3 173 1.09 0.85 0 2
champsprev5 173 0.18 0.58 0 3
champsprev10 173 0.35 0.89 0 4
champsprev20 173 0.69 1.56 0 6
champv 172 3.07 6.40 0 20
allstaryrs 173 6.62 7.30 0 39
supstar 173 0.17 0.37 0 1
ortg 172 105.49 3.63 92.20 114.50
drtg 172 105.42 3.62 94.10 114.40
pace 172 91.17 2.58 86.20 99.70
efg0 172 0.49 0.02 0.43 0.55
defg0 172 0.48 0.02 0.43 0.53
pop 173 4,644,255 2,581,232 1,320,726 13,000,000
payrollp 173 $61,600,000 $15,100,000 $23,400,000 $127,000,000
pci 173 $43,141.24 $6,752.53 $21,889.01 $64,173.01
rcolibprev 173 $91.13 $28.92 $47.89 $183.96
attendcap 173 87.79% 13.48% 0.00% 102.07%
altsport 173 2.44 2.03 0 8
stad 173 0.17 0.38 0 1
relex 173 0.01 0.11 0 1
expan3 173 0.04 0.20 0 1
a2009 173 0.17 0.37 0 1
a2008 173 0.17 0.37 0 1
a2007 173 0.17 0.37 0 1
a2006 173 0.17 0.37 0 1
a2005 173 0.17 0.37 0 1
a2004 173 0.16 0.37 0 1
clip 173 0.03 0.18 0
nets 173 0.03 0.18 0 1
gs 173 0.03 0.18 0 1
1
 
 
32
 Payroll Model Data Summary 
 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 171 2004 2009
PayrollB 171 64,400,000 14,200,000 33,500,000 127,000,000
PopP 171 4,661,499 2,590,293 1,320,726 13,000,000
PopGR 171 1.37% 1.05% -0.40% 3.56%
f500msa 171 15.27485 17.79823 1 73
Rfanat 171 21.90539 16.5477 1 59
pci 171 43,114.18 6,759.61 21,889.01 64,173.01
col 171 $91.22 $28.96 $47.89 $183.96
altsport 171 2.520468 2.018559 0 8
Atten 171 708,010 87,266 471,374 908,600
Capac 171 19,457 1,306 16,000 22,076
A2009 171 0.1695906 0.3763749 0 1
A2008 171 0.1637427 0.3711287 0 1
A2007 171 0.1695906 0.3763749 0 1
A2006 171 0.1695906 0.3763749 0 1
A2005 171 0.1637427 0.3711287 0 1
A2004 171 0.1637427 0.3711287 0 1
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Section V- Presentation of Results 
1.) Ticket Price Model  
Ticket Price Model (10) - Forecasted Impact of the Means: 
 “Economic Weight” represents explanatory power of each variable in the 
model.  By multiplying the average value of the independent variable by 
its coefficient, we can see how each variable affect the model’s results.   
Average Value Coefficient t-Statistic Std. Error Avg. Value * Coefficient Economic Weight
Ticket Price 49.44
payrollp 61,600,000.00 3.42E-07 5.12 -6.67E-08 21.07 42.69%
winprev3 50.14% -3.484 -0.38 -9.191 -1.75 -3.54%
champsprev20 0.6878613 2.594 5.07 -0.512 1.78 3.62%
allstaryrs 6.618497 0.176 1.53 -0.116 1.16 2.36%
supstar 0.1676301 2.581 1.31 -1.972 0.43 0.88%
efg0 0.4851686 38.98 0.7 -55.3 18.91 38.32%
defg0 0.484843 -4.005 -0.07 -54.39 -1.94 -3.93%
pace 91.16919 0.832 2.56 -0.325 75.85 153.70%
pop 4,644,255 0.0000011 1.12 -9.83E-07 5.11 10.35%
pop2 2.82E+13 -6.41E-14 -0.79 0.00E+00 -1.81 -3.66%
rcolibprev 91.13 0.135 3.5 -0.0387 12.30 24.93%
attendcap 87.79% 21.11 2.83 -7.45 18.53 37.55%
stad 0.1734104 1.148 0.6 -1.92 0.20 0.40%
expan3 0.0404624 2.975 0.76 -3.901 0.12 0.24%
clip 0.0346821 2.543 0.63 -4.01 0.09 0.18%
nets 0.0346821 12.25 3.28 -3.736 0.42 0.86%
gs 0.0346821 -26.22 -6.19 -4.238 -0.91 -1.84%
a2008 0.1676301 -11.06089 -4.1 -2.697 -1.85 -3.76%
a2007 0.1676301 -8.453365 -3.33 -2.541 -1.42 -2.87%
a2006 0.1676301 -6.082849 -2.65 -2.294 -1.02 -2.07%
a2005 0.1676301 -1.079833 -0.49 -2.217 -0.18 -0.37%
a2004 0.1618497 0.00 0.00%
a2009 0.1676301 -9.251104 -3.38 -2.735 -1.55 -3.14%
Constant 1 -94.21 -2.74 -34.45 -94.21 -190.90%
Total Avg. Payroll 49.35130075 100.00%
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Ticket Price Model - Details and Significances 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES tixprice2 tixprice2 tixprice2 tixprice2 tixprice2 tixprice2 tixprice2 tixprice2 tixprice2 tixprice2
payrollp 3.42e-07***
-6.67E-08
winprev3 21.21*** 10.46 8.045 21.09** 26.76*** 17.84** -3.484
-7.835 -8.589 -10.15 -8.18 -10.17 -8.854 -9.191
champsprev20 3.213*** 2.889*** 3.349*** 1.692*** 1.950*** 1.808*** 2.594***
-0.583 -0.566 -0.588 -0.507 -0.528 -0.528 -0.512
allstaryrs 0.415*** 0.392*** 0.201* 0.224* 0.175 0.176
-0.141 -0.144 -0.119 -0.12 -0.125 -0.116
supstar 4.481* 3.867* 4.494** 4.749** 4.225** 2.581
-2.358 -2.322 -2.056 -2.063 -2.103 -1.972
efg0 118.8* 63.2 38.98
-66.54 -59.54 -55.3
defg0 99.04 2.63 -4.005
-70.47 -58.76 -54.39
pace 0.583 0.646* 0.832**
-0.407 -0.349 -0.325
pop 3.01e-06*** 2.43e-06** 1.94E-07 1.68E-07 3.68E-08 1.10E-06
-1.07E-06 -1.05E-06 -1.04E-06 -1.03E-06 -1.04E-06 -9.83E-07
rcolibprev 0.190*** 0.184*** 0.151*** 0.134*** 0.127*** 0.135***
-0.0419 -0.0424 -0.0403 -0.0412 -0.0417 -0.0387
attendcap 36.59*** 24.95*** 9.683 10.59 10.34 21.11***
-7.861 -6.557 -7.614 -7.96 -7.723 -7.45
stad -1.236 3.65 0.715 1.175 0.711 1.148
-2.61 -2.245 -2.1 -2.102 -2.073 -1.92
expan3 -3.057 -0.664 -1.095 -0.53 -1.383 2.975
-5.343 -4.423 -4.096 -4.087 -4.115 -3.901
clip 6.273 7.679 9.190** -11.34** 1.267 -10.74** -2.701 -1.867 -1.098 2.543
-4.848 -4.678 -4.575 -4.585 -4.972 -4.415 -4.219 -4.247 -4.265 -4.01
nets 11.46** 9.742** 12.31*** 4.6 13.08** 8.303* 8.372** 9.913** 10.03** 12.25***
-4.837 -4.748 -4.714 -4.361 -5.071 -4.255 -4.001 -4.109 -4.01 -3.736
gs -14.76*** -13.41*** -16.61*** -35.03*** -19.24*** -33.21*** -25.21*** -24.25*** -26.55*** -26.22***
-4.854 -4.683 -4.734 -4.893 -4.993 -4.718 -4.506 -4.516 -4.58 -4.238
pop2 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 -6.41E-14
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
drtg 0.523*
-0.294
ortg 0.0177
-0.303
Constant 37.97*** 40.57*** -114.8*** 19.99*** 18.39** -0.768 14.35** -46.48 -72.53* -94.21***
-4.48 -4.566 -43.46 -4.728 -7.289 -7.238 -7.126 -34.08 -36.94 -34.45
Adj. R-squared 0.253 0.31 0.354 0.41 0.196 0.463 0.562 0.567 0.579 0.639
R-squared 0.296 0.359 0.41 0.447 0.248 0.506 0.608 0.618 0.63 0.686
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dummies for years 2004-2009 included in each model.
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Ticket Price Model - Model’s Used to Find Predicted Values/Residuals: 
 
(6)  γ =  β1 (Population) + β2 (Population Squared) + β 3 (Cost of Living) + β4 (Attendance Capacity) + β 5 (New   
 Stadium Previous 5 Years Dummy) + β6 (Expansion Team Dummy) + μ 
 
(7)  γ = β1 (Avg. Winning % Over Past 3 Seasons) + β2 (# of Championships Over Past 20 Seasons) + β3 (# of 
Combined All-Star Appearances on Roster) + β4 (“Superstar” Dummy)) + β5 (Population) + β6 (Population Squared) 
+ β7(Cost of Living) + β8 (Attendance Capacity) + β9 (New Stadium Previous 5 Years Dummy) + β10 (Expansion 
Team Dummy) + μ 
 
(8)  γ =β1 (Avg. Winning % Over Past 3 Seasons) + β2 (# of Championships Over Past 20 Seasons) + β3 (# of 
Combined All-Star Appearances on Roster) + β4 (“Superstar” Dummy) + β5 (Defensive Rating) + β6 (Offensive 
Rating)  + β7 (Population) + β8 (Population Squared) + β 9 (Cost of Living) + β10 (Attendance Capacity) + β11 (New 
Stadium Previous 5 Years Dummy) + β12 (Expansion Team Dummy) + μ 
 
(9)  γ = β1 (Avg. Winning % Over Past 3 Seasons) + β2 (# of Championships Over Past 20 Seasons) + β3 (# of 
Combined All-Star Appearances on Roster) + β4 (“Superstar” Dummy) + β5 (Effective Field Goal %) + β6 (Defensive 
Effective Field Goal Percentage) + β7 (Pace) + β8 (Population) + β9 (Population Squared) + β10 (Cost of Living) + β11 
(Attendance Capacity) + β12 (New Stadium Previous 5 Years Dummy) + β13 (Expansion Team Dummy) + μ 
 
(10)  γ = β1 (Previous Season’s Payroll)  + β2 (Avg. Winning % Over Past 3 Seasons) + β3 (# of Championships 
Over Past 20 Seasons) + β4 (# of Combined All-Star Appearances on Roster) + β5 (“Superstar” Dummy) + β6 
(Effective Field Goal %) + β7 (Defensive Effective Field Goal Percentage) + β8 (Pace) + β9 (Population) + β10 
(Population Squared) + β11 (Cost of Living) + β12 (Attendance Capacity) + β13 (New Stadium Previous 5 Years 
Dummy) + β14 (Expansion Team Dummy) + μ 
         
 
 
*All variables lagged (Ticket 
Prices set before season’s start) 
 
**Included in all models are 
dummies for Years, LA 
Clippers, Golden State Warriors 
and New Jersey Nets 
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Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Payroll
winprev3
champsprev20
allstaryrs
supstar
efg%
defg%
pace
drtg
ortg
pop
rcolibprev
pop^2
attendcap
stad
expan3
Ticket Price Model - Results: 
 
Team tixprice2 resid (6) resid (7) resid (8) resid (9) resid (10) 6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Orlando $40.04 (8.41) (8.94) (8.98) (9.40) (9.62) 21.00% 22.33% 22.44% 23.48% 24.03%
Seattle $36.09 (13.89) (10.10) (11.90) (10.11) (8.42) 38.48% 27.99% 32.98% 28.02% 23.32%
Detroit $42.68 (11.96) (15.33) (14.36) (12.05) (9.84) 28.01% 35.93% 33.64% 28.25% 23.06%
Oklahoma City $36.35 18.69 9.33 9.71 8.40 8.22 51.41% 25.66% 26.72% 23.10% 22.63%
New Orleans $29.93 (9.80) (9.43) (9.23) (7.90) (6.71) 32.73% 31.50% 30.84% 26.40% 22.43%
Sacramento $64.86 14.09 15.17 14.86 13.30 12.30 21.72% 23.38% 22.92% 20.51% 18.96%
Denver $41.51 (5.72) (6.47) (5.66) (8.47) (7.55) 13.79% 15.59% 13.63% 20.42% 18.20%
Washington $42.43 (16.10) (10.28) (10.21) (9.74) (5.59) 37.94% 24.23% 24.06% 22.95% 13.17%
Boston $63.71 6.32 8.82 9.93 8.24 8.39 9.92% 13.85% 15.58% 12.94% 13.17%
Minnesota $40.67 (5.05) (5.34) (5.09) (4.41) (5.14) 12.41% 13.12% 12.51% 10.85% 12.63%
Los Angeles Lakers $87.43 22.46 13.67 11.89 13.08 10.79 25.70% 15.63% 13.60% 14.96% 12.34%
Cleveland $50.00 4.77 3.28 3.83 4.28 5.26 9.54% 6.56% 7.66% 8.55% 10.51%
Milwaukee $45.95 3.73 5.57 4.13 4.70 4.27 8.12% 12.12% 8.98% 10.24% 9.30%
Utah $42.62 (0.92) 0.59 0.35 1.19 3.61 2.15% 1.38% 0.81% 2.80% 8.46%
Chicago $59.32 1.46 (2.62) (2.28) (4.48) (4.30) 2.47% 4.41% 3.84% 7.55% 7.24%
Indiana $45.47 4.31 3.33 4.34 3.52 3.04 9.47% 7.32% 9.55% 7.74% 6.68%
Houston $53.77 3.80 3.02 3.73 4.15 3.55 7.06% 5.62% 6.94% 7.72% 6.60%
Philadelphia $45.46 (4.62) (2.33) (1.76) (2.01) (2.66) 10.16% 5.14% 3.87% 4.41% 5.86%
Memphis $37.35 (0.89) (0.27) (0.43) (1.58) (1.70) 2.39% 0.71% 1.16% 4.24% 4.54%
Portland $50.20 5.49 7.99 7.63 9.75 2.25 10.93% 15.92% 15.20% 19.42% 4.48%
Dallas $59.62 7.86 7.92 6.65 7.54 2.66 13.19% 13.29% 11.15% 12.65% 4.46%
Atlanta $40.66 (5.85) 0.54 0.12 0.64 1.61 14.39% 1.33% 0.29% 1.57% 3.95%
Phoenix $56.32 3.43 4.42 4.05 0.80 1.94 6.09% 7.84% 7.18% 1.42% 3.44%
Charlotte $34.93 (3.57) 1.03 0.93 0.45 1.05 10.22% 2.95% 2.66% 1.28% 2.99%
San Antonio $49.78 4.16 (3.24) (2.32) (2.93) (0.74) 8.36% 6.51% 4.66% 5.90% 1.48%
Miami $55.16 (0.67) (3.67) (3.20) (1.68) (0.77) 1.22% 6.66% 5.80% 3.05% 1.40%
New York $73.17 (0.47) 0.66 0.58 1.08 0.80 0.64% 0.90% 0.79% 1.48% 1.10%
Los Angeles Clippers $51.85 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Golden State $30.70 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
New Jersey $59.60 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
less than 4.00%
between 4% and 12.00%
greater than 12.00%
Model Residuals Residual / Ticket Price
Residual Variation From Team's Average Ticket Price
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 As you can see on p.35-36, each model uses a slightly different set of variables.  
Model (6) includes demographic and stadium characteristics.  Building on this, Model (7) 
includes demographic and stadium characteristics and team quality measures.  Model (8) 
includes the above and adds in team performance data (defensive rating and offensive 
rating) to measure on-the-court quality.  Model (9) replaces defensive rating and 
offensive rating with pace, offensive and defensive effective field goal percentage as 
alternate on-court quality measures.  Finally, Model (10) adds payroll to Model (9).  I 
focus on this model for final results as it has the highest explanatory power with a .686   
r-squared value (p.35).  Additionally, all sets of independent variables are accounted for.   
  In model (10), the majority of variables are significant at the 10% level, as 
displayed on p.35.  “Payrollp,” “champsprev20,” “pace,” “rcolibprev” and “attendcap” 
are all significant and their coefficients are positive (as expected).  “Allstaryrs,” “supstr,” 
“efg,” “dfg,” “pop,” “stad,” and “expan3” all have the expected coefficient signs.  
Although they are not significant, they are close to it.  It is noteworthy that in Model (9), 
in which “payrollp” is left out, “winprev3” and “supstar” are significant at the 10% level.  
Model (10) is used in calculating predicted values because it has higher explanatory 
power, even though it makes two independent variables insignificant.   
 Fitted Values and Residuals are calculated for Model (10). The table on p.35 
shows that this model uses the most independent variables.  These independents have the 
expected coefficient signs and high significances.  The table on p. 37 shows model 
residuals and model residuals as a percentage of real ticket prices in five highlighted 
models. Model (10) is focused on, but it is noteworthy that all five models have similar 
results.  The right column shows the absolute value of the residual as a percentage of real 
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ticket prices in Model (10).  The table shows that some teams are close and others far 
from what Model (10) predicts for their ticket prices.  Some of the clearly mis-pricing 
teams are Orlando, New Orleans, Washington, Sacramento, Detroit and Oklahoma City.  
Alternatively, teams pricing their tickets well according to my model are Phoenix, 
Charlotte, San Antonio, Miami and New York.   The chart on p. 37 shows the residuals as 
a percentage of ticket prices in Model (10) and sheds more clarity on the above table.  
Here, it is very clear that Orlando, Seattle and Detroit are all under-pricing their tickets 
by over 20%, but Oklahoma City, Sacramento, Boston and Los Angeles are overpricing. 
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2.) Payroll Model 
 
 
Payroll Model - forecasted impact of the means: 
 “Economic Weight” represents explanatory power of each variable in the 
model.  By multiplying the average value of the variable by its coefficient, 
we can see how each variable affect the model’s results.   
 
 
Average Value Coefficient t-Statistic Std. Error Portion of Model Economic Weight
Payroll 64,400,000
PopP 4,661,499 -2.28 -1.38 -1.647 (10,628,218)
PopP2 2.84E+13 2.99E-07 2.43 -1.23E-07 8,491,600
(2,136,618) -3.31%
PopGR 1.37% 2.23E+08 2.09 -1.07E+08 3,042,808 4.71%
pci 43,114.18 3,681 2.91 -1,265 158,703,297
pci2 1.90E+09 -0.042 -3.05 -0.0138 (79,800,000)
78,903,297 122.23%
col $91.22 -355,327 -1.58 -225,091 (32,411,401)
col2 $9,153.92 2,082 2.03 -1,028 19,058,464
(13,352,938) -20.68%
f500msa 15.27485 356,896 2.31 -154,230 5,451,533 8.44%
Rfanat 21.90539 152,944 2.18 -70,310 3,350,298 5.19%
altsport 2.520468 -2.77E+06 -1.86 -1.49E+06 (6,974,135) -10.80%
Capac 19,457 1,388 1.72 -808.1 27,006,996 41.84%
A2009 0.1695906 8,604,031 2.85 3,014,503 1,459,163 2.26%
A2008 0.1637427 4,514,770 1.54 2,936,175 739,261 1.15%
A2007 0.1695906
A2006 0.1695906 -381,704 -0.13 2,942,278 (64,733) -0.10%
A2005 0.1637427 -2,115,182 -0.68 3,097,779 (346,346) -0.54%
A2004 0.1637427 -4,604,813 -1.41 3,257,065 (754,005) -1.17%
Constant 1 -31,770,000 (31,770,000) -49.21%
Total Avg. Payroll 64,554,581 100.00%
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES PayrollB PayrollB PayrollB PayrollB PayrollB PayrollB PayrollB PayrollB
Dummies for years 2004-2009 included in each model
PopP -3.169*** -3.907*** -2.463* -2.506*
-1.142 -1.279 -1.439 -1.437
PopP2 4.50e-07*** 4.92e-07*** 3.55e-07*** 3.22e-07***
-9.08E-08 -9.42E-08 -1.12E-07 -1.15E-07
PopGR 1.38E+08 1.647e+08* 1.564e+08* 1.628e+08*
-8.92E+07 -9.40E+07 -9.33E+07 -9.33E+07
pci 3,413** 3,257*** 3,792*** 3,620***
-1,378 -1,230 -1,275 -1,280
pci2 -0.0335** -0.0347*** -0.0409*** -0.0396***
-0.0151 -0.0132 -0.0138 -0.0139
col -782,942*** -487,407** -473,749**
-206,112 -225,144 -225,031
col2 4,109*** 2,327** 2,299**
-926.8 -1,045 -1,043
f500msa 315,039*** 96,124
-53,165 -77,516
F500c 883,938***
-107,152
Rfanat
altsport
Atten
Capac
Constant 6.854e+07*** -1.51E+07 -4.24E+06 1.023e+08*** 5.20E+06 6.405e+07*** 6.214e+07*** 4.49E+06
-3.90E+06 -3.12E+07 -2.79E+07 -1.10E+07 -2.95E+07 -2.47E+06 -2.31E+06 -2.96E+07
Adj. R-squared 0.343 0.139 0.363 0.228 0.374 0.248 0.355 0.376
R-squared 0.374 0.174 0.4 0.26 0.418 0.274 0.377 0.424
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
VARIABLES PayrollB PayrollB PayrollB PayrollB PayrollB PayrollB PayrollB PayrollB
PopP -1.811 -2.729* -1.448 -2.829* -3.544** -2.829* -3.028* -2.28
-1.5 -1.453 -1.584 -1.587 -1.439 -1.587 -1.628 -1.647
PopP2 2.39e-07* 3.80e-07*** 2.62e-07** 3.03e-07** 3.92e-07*** 3.03e-07** 3.14e-07*** 2.99e-07**
-1.36E-07 -1.14E-07 -1.22E-07 -1.18E-07 -1.09E-07 -1.18E-07 -1.20E-07 -1.23E-07
PopGR 9.81E+07 1.750e+08* 1.40E+08 2.183e+08** 2.204e+08** 2.183e+08** 2.421e+08** 2.229e+08**
-1.01E+08 -9.43E+07 -9.60E+07 -9.57E+07 -9.28E+07 -9.57E+07 -1.05E+08 -1.07E+08
pci 3,357** 3,705*** 3,740*** 3,676*** 3,838*** 3,676*** 3,659*** 3,681***
-1,304 -1,275 -1,272 -1,232 -1,239 -1,232 -1,235 -1,265
pci2 -0.0366** -0.0406*** -0.0434*** -0.0408*** -0.0396*** -0.0408*** -0.0405*** -0.0420***
-0.0141 -0.0138 -0.0138 -0.0134 -0.0135 -0.0134 -0.0135 -0.0138
col -317,361 -469,688** -365,566 -381,364* -497,862** -381,364* -376,731* -355,327
-251,826 -225,232 -226,423 -219,219 -218,821 -219,219 -219,846 -225,091
col2 1,634 2,287** 2,052** 2,110** 2,370** 2,110** 2,117** 2,082**
-1,140 -1,043 -1,034 -1,001 -1,015 -1,001 -1,003 -1,028
f500msa 386,036** 383,599** 383,599** 373,554** 356,896**
-154,255 -149,315 -149,315 -150,660 -154,230
F500c 335,274
-225,757
Rfanat 71,057 166,279** 162,978** 162,978** 158,526** 152,944**
-57,609 -70,318 -68,073 -68,073 -68,660 -70,310
altsport -3.046e+06** -2.609e+06* -2.609e+06* -2.540e+06* -2.767e+06*
-1.49E+06 -1.44E+06 -1.44E+06 -1.45E+06 -1.49E+06
Atten 37.16*** 35.43*** 37.16*** 34.69***
-10.99 -11.04 -10.99 -11.82
Capac 486.1 1,388*
-846.6 -808.1
Constant 682,128 1.50E+06 -4.90E+06 -2.57E+07 -2.18E+07 -2.57E+07 -3.34E+07 -3.18E+07
-2.94E+07 -2.95E+07 -2.97E+07 -2.97E+07 -2.99E+07 -2.97E+07 -3.27E+07 -3.34E+07
Adj. R-squared 0.379 0.376 0.393 0.431 0.409 0.431 0.429 0.400
R-squared 0.426 0.424 0.446 0.485 0.454 0.485 0.486 0.457
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
Payroll Model - models used to find predicted values/residuals: 
 
(5)  γ = β1 (Population) + β2 (Population Squared) + β3 (Population Growth) + β4 (Per Capita 
Income) + β5 (Per Capita Income Squared) + β6 (Cost of Living) + β7 (Cost of Living Squared) 
+ μ 
 
(8) γ = β1 (Population) + β2 (Population Squared) + β3 (Population Growth) + β4 (Per Capita 
Income) + β5 (Per Capita Income Squared) + β6 (Cost of Living) + β7 (Cost of Living Squared) 
+ β8 (Fortune 500 MSA) + μ 
 
(9) γ = β1 (Population) + β2 (Population Squared) + β3 (Population Growth) + β4 (Per Capita 
Income) + β5 (Per Capita Income Squared) + β6 (Cost of Living) + β7 (Cost of Living Squared) 
+ β8 (Fortune 500 City) + μ 
 
(11) γ = β1 (Population) + β2 (Population Squared) + β3 (Population Growth) + β4 (Per 
Capita Income) + β5 (Per Capita Income Squared) + β6 (Cost of Living) + β7 (Cost of Living 
Squared) + β8 (Fortune 500 MSA) + β9 (Fanaticism Index) + β10 (Alternative Sports) +  μ 
 
(16) γ = β1 (Population) + β2 (Population Squared) + β3 (Population Growth) + β4 (Per 
Capita Income) + β5 (Per Capita Income Squared) + β6 (Cost of Living) + β7 (Cost of Living 
Squared) + β8 (Fortune 500 MSA) + β9 (Fanaticism Index) + β10 (Alternative Sports) +  β11 
(Stadium Capacity) + μ 
 
 
 Model 5 Model 8 Model 9 Model 11 Model 16
Pop
Pop^2
Pop Growth
Per Capita Income
PCI^2
Cost of Living
CoL^2
Fortune500 MSA
Fortune500 City
Fanatacism
Alternative Sports
Arena Capacity
**All models include 
dummy variables for each 
year. 
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Payroll Model – Results: 
Team Payrollb resid5 resid8 resid9 resid11 resid16 Resid Variation % of Payroll
Charlotte 46,670,875 (21,130,998) (21,248,974) (20,444,654) (21,050,998) (21,557,270)
(11,864,469) (11,578,465) (12,707,241) (14,063,777) (12,346,133)
(13,016,944) (12,301,112) (11,003,320) (11,775,600) (11,966,880)
(13,646,912) (13,630,920) (13,232,268) (13,067,524) (11,238,828)
(6,548,594) (6,370,806) (5,762,666) (5,461,466) (6,727,566)
(7,492,057) (6,143,029) (5,820,849) (6,916,749) (6,695,665)
(4,174,715) (3,849,595) (2,714,035) (4,050,355) (5,472,747)
(4,050,006) (3,765,254) (3,499,678) (6,412,350) (5,392,014)
(57,816) (323,380) (265,700) (4,120,836)
(1,339,638) (1,243,590) (1,810,290) (500,866) (3,731,054)
(3,209,190) (1,970,806)
(5,759,871) (5,372,435) (6,105,247) (5,348,311) (1,654,127)
(2,878,794) (3,562,986) (6,764,538) (1,158,922) (1,346,254)
(94,963) (448,103) (887,527)
(3,165,136) (2,888,892) (2,618,380) (3,893,556) (436,132)
(902,170) (923,154) (1,410,502) (1,910,338) (418,782)
(24,896) (377,796)
(1,957)
1,112,616 2.38%
Atlanta 52,893,619 2,485,312 4.70%
Chicago 59,161,688 2,013,624 3.40%
Los Angeles Clippers 53,141,541 2,408,084 4.53%
Utah 54,545,730 1,266,100 2.32%
Washington 57,934,752 1,671,208 2.88%
Oklahoma City 68,341,605 2,758,712 4.04%
Denver 59,847,754 2,912,672 4.87%
Detroit 60,334,208 84,720 4,205,556 6.97%
Memphis 60,919,186 3,230,188 5.30%
New Jersey 62,508,346 1,635,718 2,207,382 2,029,846 5,416,572 8.67%
Seattle 53,281,265 4,451,120 8.35%
Houston 64,823,463 5,605,616 8.65%
Golden State 59,877,021 652,569 43,869 1,540,096 2.57%
New Orleans 54,877,004 3,457,424 6.30%
Milwaukee 61,117,866 1,491,556 2.44%
San Antonio 60,077,496 266,544 1,023,744 69,052 1,401,540 2.33%
Sacramento 64,734,542 2,440,886 2,615,742 3,676,678 2,676,570 1,443,374 2,233,304 3.45%
Orlando 63,315,606 4,018,450 4,003,566 4,284,046 3,833,626 1,923,730 2,360,316 3.73%
Cleveland 63,526,448 4,498,720 4,579,568 2,933,296 2,170,000 2,148,796 2,430,772 3.83%
Minnesota 67,467,074 5,932,867 5,311,779 4,556,307 5,286,967 3,015,866 2,917,000 4.32%
Miami 62,292,271 107,439 517,787 532,703 3,384,319 3,386,276 5.44%
New York 104,725,899 5,039,835 4,490,075 3,889,475 4,285,659 4,211,091 1,150,360 1.10%
Phoenix 62,756,162 1,679,890 1,402,154 953,010 1,703,306 5,855,474 4,902,464 7.81%
Philadelphia 72,256,764 6,467,761 7,517,617 7,324,197 6,724,753 6,205,369 1,312,248 1.82%
Los Angeles Lakers 71,542,043 4,745,376 4,762,668 5,166,324 5,326,164 7,166,832 2,421,456 3.38%
Boston 66,257,003 4,926,972 6,240,012 4,748,436 4,836,396 7,987,716 3,239,280 4.89%
Indiana 66,748,446 2,745,158 3,186,954 3,629,098 4,092,786 8,390,542 5,645,385 8.46%
Portland 75,713,265 14,234,065 14,497,177 14,670,225 15,323,821 12,417,261 2,906,560 3.84%
Dallas 92,624,065 25,089,752 24,664,552 25,250,424 23,811,240 19,445,448 5,804,976 6.27%
Team Spending Compared To Predicted Values - Model (16)
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 p.41-42 display each model and their included independent variables.  Model (5) 
includes demographic characteristics, which are per capita income, population, 
population growth and cost of living.  Building on this, Model (8) and Model (9) both 
include demographic characteristics, but each use a different measure of area Fortune 500 
companies as business activity measures. Model (8) considers Fortune 500 companies in 
the relevant MSA and Model (9) looks at those companies in the relevant city. Model 
(11) includes the previous and also a measure of the sports environment, including 
alternative sports teams in the area and the sports fanaticism of the population.  Finally, 
Model (16) adds stadium capacity to the previous models to include a measure of in-
stadium revenue potential.  I focus on this model for final results as it has high 
explanatory power with a .457 r-squared value (p.41). More importantly, all sets of 
independent variables accounted for.   
 Fitted values and residuals are calculated for Model (16). The table on p.41 shows 
that this model uses the most of independent variables.  These have the expected 
coefficient signs and high significances.  The majority of variables are significant, as 
displayed on p. 41.   “altsport” and “Capac” are significant at the 10% level.  “PopP2,” 
“PopGR,” col2,” “f500msa” “rfanat” are significant at the 5% level. “Pci” and “pci2” are 
significant at the 1% level.  Therefore, all variables but “PopP” and “col” are significant, 
but these are correlated with their squares: “PopP2” and “col2.”  Model (15) (which is not 
highlighted) is a similar Model to (16), but it includes the variable “Atten.”  When this 
variable is added, all other variables except “capac,” (stadium capacity of the previous 
year) are significant at least on the 10% level. This model was not used for results 
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because stadium capacity gives an owner a better idea of revenue potential than previous 
year’s total attendance. 
 The table on p.45 shows the residuals of each of these five models.  Also included 
is the variation in these five residual sets as a percentage of team payroll.  This shows that 
all five models used give very similar results, with the highest residual variation being 
around 8.5% and the lowest being around 1%.  Therefore, with a range of independent 
variables used, the results are extremely similar.  The residuals from model (16) are 
visualized in the graph below on p.45.  For our purposes, we will focus on the teams that 
are underspending on payroll compared to what model (10) predicts.  Charlotte severely 
under-spends on payroll by about $20 million on average annually. Oklahoma City, Utah, 
Chicago and Atlanta are also significantly under their predicted payrolls.  Comparatively, 
the small market teams of Portland, Indiana and Phoenix spend above the levels they are 
supposed to.  Dallas, Boston and Los Angeles Lakers are large market teams who also 
spend above their predicted values. Overspending, in this analysis, is considered 
acceptable because it shows ownership is attempting to put a better product on the floor.  
Owners who spend below their fitted values on team payrolls are not performing well in 
this important measure. 
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 The following graph shows that there is an apparent relationship between a team’s 
payroll spending and ticket prices.  Oftentimes, teams that overspend on payroll also 
charge very high prices on their tickets.  Conversely, many teams who under-spend on 
payroll charge less than they could on tickets.  It is difficult to discern, however, a strong 
relationship between under-spending on payroll and high ticket price residuals.  
 
 
Payroll Residual vs. Ticket Price Residual
(15.00)
(10.00)
(5.00)
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
(25,000,000
)
(20,000,000
)
(15,000,000
)
(10,000,000
)
(5,000,000) 0 5,000,000 10,000,000 15,000,000 20,000,000 25,000,000
Payroll (5) Residual
Ti
ck
et
 P
ric
e 
(1
6)
 R
es
id
ua
l
 
 
46
 3.) Owner Performance Valuation 
Owner Performance: a.) Venue Revenue
Team Arena Sponsorship Revenues (millions) Grade Revenue Per Fan/PCI Grade Attendance capacity Increase '04-'08 Grade Final Grade
Chicago $1.80 C 27.59% C 11.41% A C
Minnesota $1.25 C 30.47% C -17.91% C C
New Jersey $0.28 C 10.73% C 4.71% B C
New Orleans $0.00 C 96.66% A -1.05% C C
Philadelphia $1.40 C 27.33% C -22.64% C C
Atlanta $9.00 A 27.94% C 17.99% A B
Dallas $6.50 A 41.88% B 0.74% B B
Denver $3.40 B 63.80% B -1.32% C B
Detroit $0.00 C 75.42% A 3.69% B B
Golden State $3.00 B 26.49% C 24.63% A B
Houston $5.00 B 42.13% B 15.40% A B
Indiana $2.00 B 87.07% A -24.33% C B
Los Angeles Clippers $5.00 B 22.39% C 7.18% A B
Los Angeles Lakers $5.00 B 58.22% B 0.14% B B
Memphis $4.50 B 85.13% A -13.22% C B
Miami $2.10 B 35.17% C 31.18% A B
New York n/a 30.41% C 5.21% A B
Oklahoma City $0.54 C 139.92% A n/a B
Phoenix $0.87 C 69.34% B 12.67% A B
Portland $0.00 C 90.68% A 20.82% A B
Sacramento $0.75 C 83.17% A -18.28% C B
Washington $2.93 B 22.39% C 17.23% A B
Charlotte n/a 79.63% A 1.98% B B
Milwaukee n/a 70.48% A -2.72% C B
Seattle n/a n/a 4.59% B B
Boston $7.75 A 40.84% B 17.82% A A
Cleveland n/a 140.94% A 11.91% A A
Orlando $4.00 B 89.14% A 23.50% A A
San Antonio $2.05 B 137.97% A 5.58% A A
Utah n/a 190.41% A 6.64% A A
Mean $2.88 67.03% 4.95%
A > $5.00 70.00% 5.00%
A < B < $2.00 40.00% 0.00%
C < $2.00 40.00% 0.00%
*Revenue Per Fan based on 2009 data
 
 In considering an owner’s performance in gaining revenue from his/her stadium 
or venue capabilities, there appears to be many owners who are average (B grade) and 
few who are good (A grade) or bad (C Grade).  The second smallest market in the NBA 
by population, New Orleans, performs poorly in gaining arena revenue.  Chicago, one of 
the largest markets, also has low venue revenues.  Orlando, San Antonio and Utah, some 
of the smallest markets in the NBA, all perform very well here, as they have increased 
their attendance, gained significant naming-rights revenues and also capitalized on 
revenue per fan over per capita income. 
 
 
47
Owner Performance: b.) Media Product
Team TV Ratings TV households Ratings*Households Share of NBA TV Revenue Grade
Charlotte 0.93 10,000 9,300 2.02 C
Minnesota 0.75 13,000 9,750 2.12 C
New Jersey 0.29 39,000 11,310 2.46 C
Los Angeles Clippers 0.44 27,000 11,880 2.58 C
Oklahoma City 1.91 12,000 22,920 4.98 C
Indiana 1.63 20,000 32,600 7.09 C
Orlando 2 1.57 21,000 32,970 7.17 C
Washington 1.18 34,000 40,120 8.72 C
Golden State 1.35 35,000 47,250 10.27 C
Milwaukee 2.27 22,000 49,940 10.86 C
Philadelphia 1.24 41,000 50,840 11.05 C
Orlando 2.1 30,000 63,000 13.70 C
New York 0.95 77,000 73,150 15.90 B
Atlanta 1.93 39,000 75,270 16.36 B
Atlanta 2 1.66 48,000 79,680 17.32 B
Detroit 1.98 46,000 91,080 19.80 B
Miami 2.48 38,000 94,240 20.49 B
Memphis 2.13 53,870 114,742 24.94 B
Denver 2.78 42,000 116,760 25.38 B
Dallas 2.41 55,000 132,550 28.82 B
Portland 3.52 41,000 144,320 31.37 B
Houston 2.83 63,000 178,290 38.76 A
Phoenix 3.18 59,000 187,620 40.79 A
Chicago 2.35 84,000 197,400 42.91 A
Boston 3.11 83,000 258,130 56.12 A
San Antonio 6.61 54,000 356,940 77.60 A
Los Angeles Lakers 3.54 197,000 697,380 151.60 A
Cleveland 8.59 130,000 1,116,700 242.76 A
New Orleans n/a
Sacramento n/a
 
Seattle n/a
Utah n/a
Total NBA TV Revenue 4600 Mean 33.36
A > 35
A > B > 15
C < 15
* TV Ratings based on 2009 data
**Memphis # TV Households in 2009 is avg. of rest (unavailable data)
***Total NBA TV Revenue based on years 2002-2008, in millions
 
 
 
 In evaluating an owner’s ability to sell his/her product through the media, it is 
important to look at TV ratings.  Medium market teams like Cleveland and Phoenix, large 
ones like Boston and Chicago, and even small market ones like Portland and San Antonio 
get account for a large percentage of total NBA TV revenues. The teams that struggle in 
getting viewership vary between large and small market.  These teams include 
Minnesota, Charlotte, Washington, Golden State, Philadelphia and Memphis. 
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Owner Performance: c.) Front Office Product
Team Brand Management Value/Team Value Win-Player Cost Ratio Combined Score Grade
Sacramento 9 39 351
Los Angeles Clippers 9 47 423
Washington 10 45 450 C
Memphis 7 66 462
Oklahoma City 9 52 468
Minnesota 9 56 504
New York 10 54 540 C
Milwaukee 8 74 592
Golden State 9 67 603
Charlotte 8 83 664
Indiana 9 80 720
Seattle 11 74 814 B
New Jersey 10 83 830 B
New Orleans 7 122 854
Detroit 11 85 935 B
Philadelphia 10 106 1060 B
Phoenix 12 94 1128 B
Chicago 11 107 1177 B
Dallas 12 99 1188 B
Portland 11 109 1199 B
Houston 9 140 1260 A
Utah 11 116 1276 A
Atlanta 10 128 1280 A
Miami 12 108 1296 A
San Antonio 11 127 1397 A
Cleveland 11 150 1650 A
Boston 12 149 1788 A
Denver 11 169 1859 A
Orlando 12 188 2256 A
Los Angeles Lakers 14 192 2688 A
*All data based on 2009
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
B
 
 The Front Office product is an important aspect of an owner’s performance.  We 
consider both how well a front office markets its team as a brand and how efficiently it 
spends money.  These values are then multiplied to give a combined number (and 
therefore score)  As expected, Washington and LA Clippers are lacking in this field as 
both have ample large market potential but minimal following.  Charlotte, Indiana, 
Sacramento and Oklahoma City have had little success with their front office operations 
and brand management.  Comparatively, Portland, Utah, San Antonio, Miami and 
Cleveland have excelled as small and medium market teams. 
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Owner Performance: Final Grade
Media Product Front Office Venue Revenue Final Grade
Minnesota C C C C
Charlotte C C B C+
Golden State C C B C+
Indiana C C B C+
Los Angeles Clippers C C B C+
Milwaukee C C B C+
New Jersey C B C C+
Oklahoma City C C B C+
Washington C C B C+
Memphis B C B B-
New Orleans n/a B C B-
New York B C B B-
Philadelphia C B C B-
Sacramento n/a C B B-
Chicago A B C B
Dallas B B B B
Detroit B B B B
Portland B B B B
Seattle n/a B B B
Atlanta B A B B+
Denver B A B B+
Miami B A B B+
Orlando C A A B+
Phoenix A B B B+
Houston A A B A-
Los Angeles Lakers A A B A-
Boston A A A A
Cleveland A A A A
San Antonio A A A A
Utah n/a A A A
 
 Combining “Front Office Product,” “Media Product” and “Venue Revenue” 
valuations, each owner is given a final grade on their performance outside of Payroll 
Spending and Gate Revenue/Ticket Pricing.  Small market teams such as Utah and San 
Antonio perform very well while Charlotte, Indiana and Oklahoma City perform poorly.  
Ownership for Orlando and Phoenix, two small/medium market teams according to 
population, also perform well.  For the large market teams, Los Angeles Lakers, Boston, 
and Houston perform well and Los Angeles Clippers, Washington and New Jersey 
perform poorly.
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4.) Efficient Evaluation Scorecard: 
-scores ranging from C (poor) to A (very good) 
 
Small Market Teams: 
 
Oklahoma City Thunder:  
 
Ticket Prices: C-  Payroll Spending: B-  Owner Performance: C+ 
Overall: C+ 
 
 
Seattle Supersonics 
 
Ticket Prices: C-  Payroll Spending: B  Owner Performance: B 
Overall: B- 
 
 
New Orleans Hornets:  
 
Ticket Prices: C-  Payroll Spending: B+  Owner Performance: B- 
Overall: C+ 
 
 
 
Memphis Grizzlies: 
 
Ticket Prices: B+  Payroll Spending: B-  Owner Performance: B- 
Overall: B 
 
 
 
Utah Jazz: 
 
Ticket Prices: B-  Payroll Spending: C+  Owner Performance: A 
Overall: B+ 
 
 
 
San Antonio Spurs:  
 
Ticket Prices: A   Payroll Spending: A-  Owner Performance: A 
Overall: A 
 
 
Milwaukee Bucks 
 
Ticket Prices: B-  Payroll Spending: B+  Owner Performance: C+ 
Overall: B 
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Indiana Pacers 
 
Ticket Prices: B   Payroll Spending: A  Owner Performance: C+ 
Overall: B+ 
 
 
 
Portland Trail Blazers 
 
Ticket Prices: B+  Payroll Spending: A  Owner Performance: B 
Overall: A- 
 
 
 
Charlotte Bobcats 
 
Ticket Prices: A-  Payroll Spending: C-  Owner Performance: C+ 
Overall: B- 
 
 
 
Sacramento Kings 
 
Ticket Prices: C   Payroll Spending: A  Owner Performance: B- 
Overall: B 
 
 
 
Medium Market Teams: 
  
Cleveland Cavaliers 
 
Ticket Prices: B-  Payroll Spending: A  Owner Performance: A 
Overall: A- 
 
 
 
Minnesota Timberwolves 
 
Ticket Prices: C+  Payroll Spending: A  Owner Performance: C 
Overall: B- 
 
 
 
Orlando Magic 
 
Ticket Prices: C-  Payroll Spending: A  Owner Performance: B+ 
Overall: C+ 
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Denver Nuggets 
 
Ticket Prices: C   Payroll Spending: B-             Owner Performance: B+ 
Overall: B- 
 
 
Phoenix Suns 
 
Ticket Prices: A-  Payroll Spending: A  Owner Performance: B+ 
Overall: A- 
 
 
 
Miami Heat 
 
Ticket Prices: A   Payroll Spending: A  Owner Performance: B+ 
Overall: A 
 
 
 
Large Market Teams: 
 
Detroit Pistons 
 
Ticket Prices: C-  Payroll Spending: B-  Owner Performance: B 
Overall: C+ 
 
 
 
Atlanta Hawks 
 
Ticket Prices: A-  Payroll Spending: C             Owner Performance: B+ 
Overall:  B- 
 
 
 
  Houston Rockets: 
 
  Ticket Prices: B  Payroll Spending: B   Owner Performance: A- 
  Overall: B+ 
 
 
 
New Jersey Nets 
 
Ticket Prices: n/a  Payroll Spending: B             Owner Performance: C+ 
Overall: B- 
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Dallas Mavericks 
 
Ticket Prices: B+  Payroll Spending: A  Owner Performance: B 
Overall: B+ 
 
 
 
 
Golden State Warriors 
 
Ticket Prices: n/a  Payroll Spending: B+  Owner Performance: C+ 
Overall: B- 
 
 
 
Boston Celtics 
 
Ticket Prices: C   Payroll Spending: A  Owner Performance: A 
Overall: A- 
 
 
 
Philadelphia 76ers 
 
Ticket Prices: B   Payroll Spending: A  Owner Performance: B- 
Overall: B+ 
 
 
 
Los Angeles Clippers 
 
Ticket Prices: n/a  Payroll Spending: C  Owner Performance: C+ 
Overall: C+ 
 
 
 
Los Angeles Lakers 
 
Ticket Prices: C+  Payroll Spending: A  Owner Performance: A- 
Overall: A- 
 
 
 
Washington Wizards 
 
Ticket Prices: C   Payroll Spending: C+  Owner Performance: C+ 
Overall: C+ 
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Chicago Bulls 
 
Ticket Prices: B   Payroll Spending: C          Owner Performance: B 
Overall: B- 
 
 
 
New York Knicks 
 
Ticket Prices: A   Payroll Spending: A  Owner Performance: B- 
Overall: A- 
 
 
 
Section VI – Conclusion 
 
 When we judge an NBA franchise in the face of revenue sharing, we must 
consider its market’s competitive advantages and disadvantages, its attempts at winning 
and its success in profitability.  The Efficient Evaluation Scorecard on p.51-55 shows us 
that some teams do a better job at putting a good product on the court than others.  It is 
important to note that small market franchises, whose owners scorn the league when they 
find themselves unable to compete for talent with large-market teams, necessarily receive 
scrutiny if revenue sharing is used.  Large market teams have a cushion in their 
advantages in population and revenue potential.  It is necessary, therefore, that small 
market teams perform extremely well to earn their revenue sharing receipts.  A mostly 
absent owner cannot simply sit back and  collect revenue sharing checks while doing 
nothing but cutting payroll to earn higher profits.   This model eliminates any incentives 
to do so. 
 From the eyes of the NBA front office, this model makes revenue sharing more 
efficient for the league.  By focusing on gate revenue, a major aspect of a franchise’s total 
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revenues, the Ticket Price Model determines how well a team is pricing their product, and 
therefore, maximizing profits.  Since the NBA has no hard salary cap in place, teams 
have a wide range of total payrolls.  The Payroll Model shows how much a team should 
be spending considering market size and other factors. The Ownership Scorecard is a 
rough look at various metrics to see how well a franchise is extending other efforts to be 
profitable and competitive.  These considerations are far more effective than looking 
solely at revenue and population (or a combination of the two) for revenue sharing 
payments. 
 The league is better equipped to create a more efficient revenue sharing system: It 
has access to each franchise’s balance sheets, income statements, and other financial 
information.  With these financials, the league could import, for example, total 
advertising revenues into the “Venue Revenue” portion of my Ownership Scorecard.  
Since the Ownership Scorecard is a set of proxies to assign a rough value to a team’s 
operations, the league could make this measure much more accurate.  
  This paper considers alternative methods to determine revenue sharing 
receipts in order to achieve a more efficient system, and this method can be used not only 
in the NBA, but also in the NFL, MLB and NHL.  The NHL and the NFL have “hard” 
caps, in which a team is almost exclusively prevented from over spending.  However, 
these leagues still utilize revenue sharing payments and are concerned about ownership 
disincentives. By looking at a team’s marketing and front office initiatives along with 
determining how well they are pricing, the NFL/NHL can be more confident in their 
systems.  MLB, with no salary cap but heavy use of (and resistance to) revenue sharing, 
could benefit from a system like the Efficient Evaluation Scorecard.  Although MLB has 
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greater competitive balance, this seems to be a bi-product of the sport, as the disparity 
between the largest and smallest annual payrolls is astronomical.  The MLB can use 
several of these metrics, like the Ticket Price Model and the Payroll Model, to judge a 
team’s efforts. 
  An argument against this system of evaluation comes with the recognition that 
the luxury-tax threshold and the salary cap are in place to curb overspending and keep 
payrolls at an even level so that all teams can compete.  As mentioned earlier, neither of 
these tools make a significant difference.  In the 2008-2009 season, teams spent a 
combined $90 million over the luxury tax level.  All but two teams were above the 
salary-cap.  The cap is so “soft,” with all its exceptions, that it rarely prevents teams from 
spending how much they want.  Only under certain circumstances does it allow teams 
keep their players by offering them sufficient salaries. We will undoubtedly see how 
effective this is in the free-agency summer of 2010.  Additionally, in the face of the 
Payroll Models, an owner can argue that the salary cap prevents him/her from 
overspending.  If this is in fact true, the current Collective Bargaining Agreement 
negotiation can bring a change in this “soft” cap.  If it is deemed preventative (as well as 
ineffective) the league has the opportunity to change the rules and thereby enforce a more 
effective cap for greater talent distribution.  The near future holds opportunity for the 
NBA to achieve its goals of profitability and competitive balance. 
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